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Powers of Appointment-Does a General Residuary Clause
Fulfill a Specific Reference Requirement?
Powers of appointment have long been recognized as an important tool for
estate planners.1 They have been called "the most important single conveyanc-
ing device for the minimizing of death taxes,"'2 and "the most efficient device yet
contrived by which an owner may obtain... flexibility while still controlling the
general purposes to which his property shall be devoted." 3 Basically, powers of
appointment allow the recipient of a donor's property to be selected some time
after the date of the gift. The Restatement (Second) of Property defines them as
the "authority, other than as an incident of the beneficial ownership of property,
to designate recipients of beneficial interests in property."' 4 A simple example of
a power of appointment would be: A to B for life, remainder to such persons as
B may appoint by deed or will.5
One of the reasons for granting powers of appointment is that the donee
will be in a better position than the donor to know who needs the property. In
order for the donee to appoint the assets intelligently, the donee should be aware
of the power and its terms. Donees, however, are not always aware that they
hold a power and may exercise it unknowingly. Even when the donee knows of
the power, he or she might exercise it inadvertently. For example, in some states
1. "It is doubtful whether any other concept in the law of property can be used to achieve
more remarkable results than the power of appointment." L. SIMEs & A. SirrI, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 861 (2d ed. 1956).
"The power of appointment is the most efficient dispositive device that the ingenuity of Anglo-
American lawyers has ever worked out." Leach, Powers of Appointment, 24 A.B.A. J. 807, 807
(1938).
2. 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 385, at 33-6 (1987). The tax consequences
of powers of appointment are considerable. For a discussion of the tax aspects, see J. RASCH, HAR-
RIS HANDLING FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAxES §§ 2:88 to :113 (4th ed. 1984); Craven, Powers of
Appointment Act of 1951, 65 HARv. L. REv. 55 (1951).
3. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, ch. 25, Introductory Note at 1809 (1940). Chief Justice
Lord Mansfield, explaining his use of powers of appointment, has been quoted as stating in his will:
Those who are nearest and dearest to me best know how to manage and improve, and
ultimately in their turn, to divide and subdivide, the good things of this world which I
commit to their care, according to the events and contingencies which it is impossible for
me to foresee, or trace through all of the many labyrinths of time and chance.
Powell, Powers of Appointment in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1281, 1281 (1968) (citing Per Stirpes
vs. Powers of Appointment, in THE BANK OF CALIFORNIA, ESTATE PLANNING STUDIES 1 (1966)).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, 2 Donative Transfers § 11.1 (1984) [hereinafter
RyESTATEMENT]. Comment (a) to this section states that the term "power of appointment" includes
"all powers permitting the powerholder to determine who will be entitled to beneficial interests in
the property subject to the power and the extent of the beneficial interests that may be received." Id.
comment a.
5. This is an example of the traditional authority to designate beneficial interests in property.
The Restatement (Second) definition of powers of appointment also includes powers that are in
substance powers of appointment-powers of amendment, revocation, and termination. An example
is: A to B in trust to A for life, remainder to A's descendants, provided that A may revoke, alter, or
amend the trust at any time. Id. comment c. Discretionary powers of a trustee are also included
under the Restatement Second definition. An example is: A to B in trust for C, with B having
discretion to invade principal for C or some other person. Id. comment d. The power of sale or
power of attorney are not included in the Restatement (Second) definition. Id. comments e, f.
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a general residuary clause is presumed to exercise certain types of powers;6 un-
less an intent not to exercise is shown, a power the testator holds will be exer-
cised. These statutes will apply even if the testator is unaware of holding a
power or unaware that the residuary clause will exercise the power.7 If the
holder of a power exercises it unknowingly or inadvertently, unfortunate conse-
quences may follow. Inadvertent exercise may create additional federal estate
taxes,8 violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, 9 or subject the appointive assets to
the claims of creditors. 10 To prevent such unfortunate consequences, many au-
thorities recommend that the donor include a clause providing that the power
can be exercised only by specific reference to the power."1 A typical clause
reads: The power shall be deemed exercised only if specific reference is made
thereto in X's will or codicil.
In First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Fleming 12 the North Carolina Court
of Appeals held that a will's general residuary clause, which made no mention of
any power, did not exercise a power that required specific reference. 13 The court
ruled that North Carolina General Statutes sections 31-414 and 31-4315 do not
nullify a specific reference requirement. 16 Section 31-4 has been on the books
for 140 years, but prior to Fleming it had never been interpreted. 17 This Note
discusses the Fleming decision, specific reference requirements, and the court's
interpretation of the two statutes. The Note concludes that because specific ref-
erence requirements help prevent inadvertent exercise of a power of appoint-
ment, the court correctly gave them validity by holding that some reference to
the power must be made.
Archie Fleming died on December 19, 1979, survived by his wife Mary and
left a will with the following provision:
So much of the principal of this trust as shall remain in the hands of
my Trustee at the time of the death of my wife shall be transferred...
to such appointee or appointees of my wife, including my wife's estate,
6. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
7. Although no court has directly ruled on this point, the purpose of such statutes is to supply
the intent to exercise. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. Even when the donee intended
that the residuary clause not exercise the power, courts have ruled that such statutes control and
have held the power to be exercised. E.g., Estate of Carter, 47 Cal. 2d 200, 302 P.2d 301 (1956); In
re Deane's Will, 4 N.Y.2d 326, 151 N.E.2d 184, 175 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1958). Presumably these statutes
would control even when the donee was unaware of the power or unaware of the effect of a general
residuary clause.
8. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., Gallo, Drafting and Exercising Powers of Appointment, 120 TR. & EST., June 1981, at
41, 42; Lauritzen, Drafting Powers ofAppointment-Problems and Suggestions, 12 TAX CouNs. Q.
363, 374 (1968). But see Rabin, Blind Exercises of Powers of Appointment, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 12-
13 (1965) (specific reference requirements serve no tax purpose, increase the likelihood of ineffective
exercise, and may cause wasteful litigation).
12. 77 N.C. App. 568, 335 S.E.2d 515 (1985).
13. Id. at 571, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-4 (1984). For the text of the statute, see infra note 27.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43 (1984). For the text of the statute, see infra note 30.
16. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 570-71, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
17. Id. at 570, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
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and in such amounts... as my wife shall appoint and direct in an
effective will or codicil specifically referring to this power of appoint-
ment .... If this power of appointment shall not be effectually exer-
cised as aforesaid as to all or any portion of such principal, so much of
the said principal... shall pass as a part of the remainder of my resid-
uary estate and be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of
Items hereinafter set forth as if I had died on the date of my wife's
death. 18
The will provided that in the event the power was not exercised, the principal of
the trust should be divided with twenty percent going to Mary and Archie's
brothers and sisters, thirty-five percent each to Elon College and Salem Acad-
emy, and ten percent to the First Presbyterian Church. 19
Mary Fleming died on June 27, 1984. Her will contained a general residu-
ary clause that read in part:
All the residue of my estate remaining after the payment of all taxes,
inheritance and estate, costs of administration, funeral expenses and
debts I will, devise and bequeath to my Executor and do direct that my
said Executor shall immediately liquidate my estate in such manner as
it may deem proper and appropriate and distribute the proceeds
thereof as follows. 20
The beneficiaries of the residuary clause were to divide the proceeds as provided:
twenty percent to Mary and Archie's brothers and sisters, twenty percent each
to Elon College and Salem Academy, and forty percent to the First Presbyterian
Church.2 1
First Citizens Bank and Trust Company, as executor of Mary Fleming's
estate and as trustee of Archie Fleming's marital trust, filed a declaratory judg-
ment asking the court to determine whether Mrs. Fleming effectively exercised
the power of appointment.2 2 If the power was effectively exercised, First Pres-
byterian Church would receive more of the principal and the schools corre-
spondingly less. Did Mary's general residuary clause, making no mention of any
powers, effectively exercise the power she held-a power that, under her hus-
band's will, required specific reference?2 3 The superior court held the power
was not effectively exercised and granted judgment on the pleadings; First Pres-
byterian Church appealed. 24
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that to exercise a
power calling for specific reference, a donee must make some reference to the
power.2 5 The court stated that a contrary holding would prevent testators from
guarding against inadvertent exercise of a general power of appointment even if
18. Id. at 569, 335 S.E.2d at 516.
19. Appellant's Brief at 2, Fleming (No. 853SC229).
20. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 570, 335 S.E.2d at 516-17.
21. Appellant's Brief at 3.
22. Id. at 1.
23. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 569, 335 S.E.2d at 516.
24. Id. at 570, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
25. Id. at 571, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
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they were specifically concerned about such inadvertence.2 6
Appellant argued that section 31-4 should apply.27 This section provides
that if the instrument exercising the power is executed in the manner prescribed
by law, failure to satisfy formal requirements imposed by the donor does not
make the exercise ineffective.28 Accordingly, a specific reference requirement
should be seen as a "formal requirement" and void as mere surplusage. The
court disagreed. Realizing that it was interpreting section 31-4 for the first time
in the statute's 140-year history, the court declined to hold that the section nulli-
fies a specific reference requirement. The court stated that "a provision calling
for reference to a power of appointment does not concern the 'execution and
attestation' of a will within the meaning of G.S. 31-4.''29
Appellant argued further that section 31-4330 should apply to exercise the
power. 3 1 Section 31-43 provides that a general residuary devise shall be con-
strued to exercise any power the testator has "to appoint in any manner he may
think proper" unless a contrary intention is shown in the will. 32 Again the court
disagreed, pointing out that section 31-43 caused North Carolina to adhere to a
minority rule that a residuary clause exercises a power of appointment upon
which no restrictions are imposed.33 Noting that the minority rule originally
developed to guard against the inadvertent failure of a life tenant to exercise a
general power of appointment, the court stated that the majority of American
jurisdictions have become more concerned with the inequity of inadvertent exer-
cise than inadvertent failure to exercise.3 4 The court stated that a donor should
be allowed to guard against inadvertent exercise, and that specific reference re-
26. Id.
27. Appellant's Brief at 7.
28. This section provides:
No appointment, made by will in the exercise of any power, shall be valid unless the same
be executed in the manner by law required for the execution of wills; and every will, exe-
cuted in such manner, shall, so far as respects the execution and attestation thereof, be a
valid execution of a power of appointment by will, notwithstanding it shall have been ex-
pressly required that a will made in exercise of such power should be executed with some
additional or other form of execution or solemnity.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-4 (1984).
29. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 570, 335 S.E.2d at 517 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-4(1984)).
30. This section provides:
A general devise of the real estate of the testator, or of his real estate in any place or in the
occupation of any person mentioned in the will, or otherwise described in a general man-
ner, shall be construed to include any real estate, or any real estate to which such descrip-
tion shall extend, as the case may be, which he may have power to appoint in any manner
he may think proper; and shall operate as an execution of such power, unless a contrary
intention shall appear by the will; and in like manner a bequest of the personal estate of the
testator, or any bequest of personal property, described in a general manner, shall be con-
strued to include any personal estate, or any personal estate to which such description shall
extend, as the case may be, which he may have power to appoint in any manner he may
think proper, and shall operate as an execution of such power, unless a contrary intention
shall appear by the will.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43 (1984).
31. Appellant's Brief at 8.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43 (1984); see supra note 30.
33. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 570, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
34. Id. at 571, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
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quirements serve this purpose. 35
The court also dealt with the procedural question of whether judgment on
the pleadings was proper. Appellant argued that such judgment was not appro-
priate, because the phrase "specifically referring to this power of appointment"
in Mr. Fleming's will and the residuary clause in Mrs. Fleming's will were both
ambiguous. Thus, according to appellant, extrinsic evidence should have been
considered to determine whether Mrs. Fleming had intended to exercise the
power.36 The court saw the ambiguity as insignificant in the context of the ac-
tion and stated, "No conceivable interpretation of the two wills could make
Mary Fleming's residuary clause meet the specific reference requirement created
by Archie Fleming's will." '3 7
Powers of appointment derive from devices that originated in feudal Eng-
land.38 Before 1540, freehold interests in land generally could not be devised.
In some localities, however, local custom made it possible for testators to give
their executors the power to sell their land.39 Although the executor had no
interest in the land, the power operated to pass the title to the vendee.4° Subse-
quently, the "use" began to accomplish substantially the same thing as these
local customs. The Court of Chancery's recognition of uses became the source
for powers of appointment.4 1 Although they originated as a means to avoid the
rule against the devise of land, powers of appointment came to be employed
successfully to avoid other rules of law. They were used to evade dower and
curtesy, to escape the incidents of feudal tenure, and to avoid the rule that mar-
ried women could not convey or devise land.42
Today, powers of appointment are an important estate planning device, and
through common usage certain terms have become associated with them. The
term "donor" describes the creator of the power and "donee" describes the
holder of the power; the "objects" are persons to whom an appointment can be
made, and an "appointee" is a person to whom an appointment has been made;
"takers in default" are persons who take the property if the power is not effec-
tively exercised.4 3
The classification of powers depends on the time when the power is exercis-
35. Id.
36. Appellant's Brief at 4-6. The appellant argued that "specifically referring to this power of
appointment" is standard boilerplate language used by attorneys and is sufficiently ambiguous to
allow the examination of circumstances surrounding the making of the wills. Id. at 6 (citing First
Union Nat'l Bank v. Moss, 32 N.C. App. 499, 233 S.E.2d 88, disc rev. denied, 292 N.C. 728, 235
S.E.2d 783 (1977)).
37. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 571, 335 S.E.2d at 517-18.
38. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 385, at 33-1; L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 1, § 872.
39. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 1, § 872, at 347.
40. L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 1, § 872, at 347.
41. A, an owner in fee simple, could transfer the land by feoffment to B in fee simple "to the use
of A for life and thereafter to the use of such persons as A should later designate." 3 R. POWELL,
supra note 2, § 385, at 33-2 n.3.
42. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 385, at 33-2.
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 11.2; 5 W. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 45.1, at
497-98 (W. Bowe & D. Parker 1962). The Restatement (Second) treats the interest held by the
objects of a power as analogous to a contingent future interest in the property subject to the power,
and thus it is transferable. RESTATEMENT supra note 4, § 11.2 comment d. Under the Restatement
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able and the scope of the permissible appointment under the power. A power
can be made exercisable presently, at some future specified date, or under the
donee's will." Most commonly, powers are either testamentary or presently
exercisable.45 Powers may also be classified as "general" or "special." A gen-
eral power exists if donees have power to appoint to themselves or to their own
estate; a special power occurs if donees have power to appoint to a group of
persons, not unreasonably large, which does not include themselves or their
estate.
46
If a person holds a general testamentary power of appointment, does a gen-
eral residuary clause in his or her will exercise the power? At common law a
general residuary clause would not exercise such a power.47 This rule grew out
of the requirement that donees must demonstrate their intent to execute the
power, and residuary clauses do not give a sufficient indication of such an inten-
tion.4 8 Unfair results, however, sometimes occurred when the rule was applied.
Donees with a life interest and a power to appoint likely thought of themselves
as "owners" of the property; expecting that a general devise would pass the
property, they would fail to refer to the power.49 Even though donees intended
that the appointive assets go to their devisees, the common-law rule defeated the
intent. 50 Legislation eventually dealt with the inequitable effects of the rule.
According to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly may have passed section 31-43 of the General Statutes to guard
against the inadvertent failure of a life tenant with a general power of appoint-
ment to exercise the power.5 1 This statute, and others like it,52 changed the
the interest of an object was analogous to the expectancy of an heir, limiting its transferability.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 338 comment b (1940).
44. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 386, at 33-11 n.3.
45. 3 R, POWELL, supra note 2, § 386, at 33-11 n.3.
46. L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 1, § 875, at 350. The Restatement (Second) uses the
terms "general" and "non-general." A power is general if it is exercisable in favor of one or more of
the following: The donee, the donee's estate, or creditors of either the donee or the donee's estate.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 11.4. The definition of "general power of appointment" for federal
tax purposes is set forth in I.R.C. § 2041(b) (1982). The comparable definition for federal gift tax
purposes is in I.R.C § 2514(c) (1982). For a comparison of the Restatement (Second) definitions of
these terms and the Internal Revenue Code definitions, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 11.4
reporter's tax note. For an in-depth discussion of the classification of powers, see 3 R. POWELL,
supra note 2, § 386.
47. Lauritzen, supra note 11, at 371; see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.40, at 562
(1952).
48. Amory v. Meredith, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 397, 398-99 (1863).
49. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 267 N.C. 173, 178, 148 S.E.2d 41, 45 (1966).
50. One court noted the usual effect of the rule, stating:
The question in this case arises from the distinction which has been adopted and settled in
courts of equity between the power of disposing of property, and the technical right of
property; a distinction which has been regretted by eminent judges, and which... although
professed to be adopted in order to further the intention of the testator, in nine cases out of
ten defeats that object.
Amory, 89 Mass. at 399 (quoting Hughes v. Turner, 3 Myl. & K. 666, 688, 40 Eng. Rep. 254, 262(Ch. 1835)).
51. Hunt, 267 N.C. at 178, 148 S.E.2d at 45.
52. The court in Hunt noted that section 31-43 is almost identical to section 27 of the English
Wills Act of 1837. Hunt, 267 N.C. at 178, 148 S.E.2d at 45.
This English statute was also the model for similar statutes in the District of Columbia, Mary-
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common-law rule by stating that a general devise or bequest shall operate as an
execution of a power of appointment unless a contrary intention appears in the
will.5 3 These statutes supplied the necessary intent lacking in the will itself.5 4
North Carolina courts have had opportunities to decide how section 31-43
applies to various wills.55 One such decision is First Union National Bank v.
Moss.5 6 In Moss a husband gave his wife a testamentary power of appointment
that required specific reference for the power to be exercised. 57 Her will devised
all the residue of her estate "including any property ... over which I have or
may have any power of appointment. s5 8 The court concluded that the term
"specifically" in the husband's will in conjunction with the term "any" in the
wife's will were sufficiently ambiguous to allow an examination of extrinsic evi-
dence.5 9 In holding that the residuary clause complied with the specificity re-
quirement, the court declined to consider the application of either section 31-43
or section 31-4.60
Section 31-4 provides that if an exercise of a power of appointment by will
is to be effective, the donee must execute a will with all the formalities required
by law. If the donee complies with those formalities, the appointment will be
effective even though he or she fails to comply with "some additional or other
form of execution or solemnity."16 1 Like section 31-43, section 31-4 came from
a similar provision in the English Wills Act.62 As the Fleming court noted,
land, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. New York passed a
similar statute that served as a model for statutes in California, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. French, Exercise of Pow-
ers of Appointment: Should Intent to Exercise Be Inferred from a General Disposition of Property?,
1979 DUKE LJ. 747, 773 & nn.128-29. Some of these statutes have been repealed. For citation to
the current statutes in these states, see infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
53. See supra text accompanying note 32.
54. Hunt, 267 N.C. at 178, 148 S.E.2d at 44.
55. See id. at 173, 148 S.E.2d at 41; Schaeffer v. Haseltine, 228 N.C. 484, 46 S.E.2d 463 (1948);
Walsh v. Friedman, 219 N.C. 151, 13 S.E.2d 250 (1941) (decided under the predecessor to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-43, North Carolina Codified Statutes § 4167 (1844)). In Johnson v. Knight, 117
N.C. 122, 23 S.E. 92 (1895), the North Carolina Supreme Court, without referring to the statute,
reached a decision in line with the statute.
56. 32 N.C. App. 499, 233 S.E.2d 88, disc. rev. denied, 292 N.C. 728, 235 S.E.2d 783 (1977).
57. Id. at 501, 233 S.E.2d at 90.
58. Id. at 502, 233 S.E.2d at 91.
59. Id. at 504, 233 S.E.2d at 92. The court noted that although "specifically" usually means
explicitly or definitely, it does not always mean that an item be individually named. Id. The court
stated that the word "any" in a will may have "one of several meanings according to the subject
which it qualifies and should be construed in context with other words used in the bequest." Id.
Because the court concluded that the words were ambiguous, it examined the circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the wills. Id.
The Moss court's conclusion that these words were ambiguous was harshly criticized by the
dissenting judge in a Missouri decision: "To treat a requirement for 'specific reference' as ambiguous
is to devalue words to meaninglessness." Cross v. Cross, 559 S.W.2d 196, 213 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(Wasserstrom, J., dissenting). In a different case, however, a dissenting judge cited the Moss decision
with approval, quoting extensively from the opinion. Estate of Eddy v. Wong, 134 Cal. App. 3d 292,
310-13, 184 Cal. Rptr. 521, 532-34 (1982) (Ziebarth, J., dissenting).
60. Moss, 32 N.C. App. at 507, 233 S.E.2d at 94.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-4 (1984); see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
62. Rabin, supra note 11, at 14-15. Other states adopted similar provisions, modeled after
either the English statute or a similar New York statute. Rabin, supra note 11, at 14. Some of these
statutes remain in force today. See, eg., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.070 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1987] 1481
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section 31-4 had never been judicially interpreted. 63
In Phillips v. Cayley64 an English court held that the comparable English
statute did not nullify a specific reference clause. H.R. Phillips held a general
power of appointment over railroad stocks under a provision that read: "upon
trust for such person or persons and for such purposes as the said H.R. Phillips
shall... by a will or codicil expressly referring to this power, appoint."' 65 A gift
in default was also made in case the power was not exercised. 66 The will of H.R.
Phillips made a general bequest of his personal estate, but did not contain any
reference to the power. 67 The court considered the statute inapplicable, because
a specific reference requirement did not concern the "execution" or "attesta-
tion" of the will within the wording of the statute. The judge in Phillips asked:
Then is a reference to the power an additional or other form of execu-
tion or solemnity within sect. 10? In my judgment it is something
quite different. It is not a form of execution or solemnity; it is some-
thing which must be in the body of the will-it must be part of the
will-and I cannot see why a testator should not be bound to refer to
the power without in any way contravening the general, and no doubt
beneficial, intention of the 27th section.68
In Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank 69 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that a Virginia statute similar to section 31-4 did not apply to a specific reference
requirement. 70 The donor's will provided: "My wife ... is hereby given ... a
general power of appointment, by specific reference to the powers granted
herein, in her will, in favor of her estate, or, at her election, in favor of any other
party." t71 The donor's will then established takers in default if the power was
not exercised2 2 The donee's will gave her sister "all of my estate, . . . or in
which I may have a power of appointment ... ,,73 The court held that the
power was not exercised, stating that the general reference to powers of appoint-
ment in the donee's will did not meet the specific reference requirement because
it made "no specific reference to donor, to his will, or to the power created by his
1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.65 (West 1947); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 10-6.2(a)(2)
(McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-05-26 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 299.4 (West
Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-11-47 (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-50 (1980).
Of the statutes based on the English statute, only section 31-4 retains the phrase, "so far as
respects the execution and attestation thereof," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-4 (1984), which one commen-
tator has said should influence any interpretation of the statute in regard to specific reference clauses.
Rabin, supra note 11, at 15. For the text of section 31-4, see supra note 28.
63. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 570, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
64. 43 Ch. D. 222 (C.A. 1889).
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id at 228. The 27th section referred to is the pertinent section of the English Wills Act,
which provides that a general residuary clause will exercise a power of appointment unless an intent
not to exercise appears.
69, 216 Va. 482, 219 S.E.2d 868 (1975).
70, Id. at 484-85, 219 S.E.2d at 871.
71. rd. at 483, 219 S.E.2d at 870.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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will."74
The issue before the Fleming court involved the effect of sections 31-4 and
31-43 on a general residuary clause that made no mention of any power. This
was unlike the Moss and Holzbach decisions, in which the donee at least em-
ployed a blanket clause referring to "any powers I may hold." The court
pointed out the lack of precedent for its decision, noting that none of the eight-
een jurisdictions with statutory schemes similar to North Carolina's have faced
the issue in the case.75 The court relied on Phillips in holding that neither sec-
tion nullifies a specific reference requirement.7 6 The court acknowledged that
other jurisdictions have given effect to specific reference clauses by statute,77 and
that the only legal scholar to address the question stated that the language of the
North Carolina statutes suggests the result.78
The court acted wisely in giving effect to a specific reference clause. The
court noted:
In a majority of American jurisdictions.., residuary clauses do not
exercise a power unless the power is mentioned in the residuary clause.
Thus, a majority of American jurisdictions are more concerned with
the inequity of inadvertent exercise of powers of appointment than of
inadvertent failure to exercise powers of appointment. To hold that
G.S. 31-4 nullifies specific reference requirements would be to prevent
a testator [donor] from guarding against inadvertent exercise of a gen-
eral power even if he were particularly concerned about such
inadvertence.7 9
The court did not elaborate on what problems attach to inadvertent exercise, but
it correctly noted that such exercise is a cause for concern. Inadvertent or unin-
tentional exercise of powers can create serious problems, including increasing
estate taxes, making the appointive assets vulnerable to the claims of creditors,
and violating the Rule Against Perpetuities.
If the power is a general power created before October 21, 1942, the appoin-
tive assets will be included in the donee's gross estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses only if the power is exercised.80 Exercise of such powers is particularly
unnecessary in cases in which the appointees are also the takers in default. If the
power remains unexercised, additional taxes on the donee's estate are avoided.
Naturally, the incidence of pre-1942 powers is dwindling.81
74. Id. at 487, 219 S.E.2d at 872.
75. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 571, 335 S.E.2d at 517.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 232.44 (West 1957)).
78. Id. (citing Rabin, supra note 11, at 14-17).
79. Id.
80. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(1) (1982). The exercise of a pre-October 21, 1942, general power of ap-
pointment in favor of a person other than the donee-holder is subject to gift tax. I.R.C. § 2514(a)
(1982).
A general power of appointment is defined for federal estate tax and North Carolina inheritance
tax purposes as any power in which holders have the authority to appoint such property in favor of
themselves, their estate, their creditors, or the creditors of their estate. I.R.C. § 2041(b) (1982); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-2(a)(5) (1985).
81. Post-October 21, 1942, powers are treated differently. The possession at death of a post-
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In addition, exercise of a general power of appointment will allow creditors
of the donee to reach the appointive assets to satisfy their claims.8 2 At common
law the rights of creditors were governed by the "equitable assets" doctrine,
which permitted creditors of the donee to reach the appointive assets under a
general power only if the power had been exercised and the donee's other avail-
able property was insufficient to satisfy the creditors.8 3 A donee could prevent
his or her creditors from proceeding against the appointive assets by failing to
exercise the power or by exercising it in favor of a bona fide purchaser.8 4 The
distinction between exercised and unexercised powers has been the subject of
criticism 85 and has been abrogated by statute in a number of states.86 In states
that have not enacted legislation to the contrary, however, the rule distinguish-
ing exercised from unexercised powers persists.8 7
Finally, the exercise of a power may violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.8 8
The Rule raises problems concerning both the creation of powers and their exer-
cise.8 9 Regarding the validity of the exercise of a power, the Rule begins to run
at a different time for general inter vivos powers than it does for special and
general testamentary powers.90 Interests created by exercise of a general inter
vivos power are measured as if a new period for the Rule began to run on the
date of the exercise. 91 Interests created by exercise of a general testamentary or
a special power, however, are measured from the time the power was created. 92
1942 general power of appointment will subject such power to inclusion in the donee's gross estate
for estate tax purposes. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (1982). An inter vivos exercise or release of such power
will result in federal gift tax consequences. I.R.C. § 2514(b) (1982). The possession at death of a
general power of appointment will also subject the assets to inclusion in the donee's gross estate for
North Carolina inheritance tax purposes. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(a)(5) (1985). For a more in-
depth analysis of the tax consequences of powers of appointment, see sources cited at supra note 2.
82, RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, §§ 13.4 to .5. The rationale put forth for this rule is that
when the donee of a general power exercises it, that exercise is for practical purposes identical to the
dominion exercised over the donee's own assets. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 13.4 comment a;
Id. § 13.5 comment a. But see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.16, at 500-01 (A. Casner ed.
1952) (questioning the rule's rationale).
83. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 2, § 389, at 33-42.
84. See, eg., Patterson & Co. v. Lawrence, 83 Ga. 703, 706-07, 10 S.E. 355, 356 (1889) (bona
fide purchaser); Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144, 149-50 (1881) (not exercising power).
85. E.g., T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS
173-74 (1984).
86. E.g., CAL, CIV. CODE § 1390.3(c) (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.123 (1979);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.70 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-7.2 (Mc-
Kinney 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 299.9 (West Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. § 702.17(3) (1975).
87. Note, Creditors' Ability to Reach Assets Under a General Power of Appointment, 24 VAND.
L. REv. 367, 372 (1971).
88. "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest." GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUIIES § 201 (4th
ed. 1942).
89. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 651 (1938). For a general discus-
sion of the Rule Against Perpetuities and powers of appointment, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY, supra note 82, § 24.30 to .36; T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 85, at 198-204; Jones, The
Rule Against Perpetuities and Powers of Appointment: An Old Controversy Revisited, 54 IOWA L.
REV. 456 (1968); Leach, supra, at 651-54; Link, The Rule Against Perpetuities in North Carolina, 57
N.C.L. REV. 727, 782-93 (1979).
90. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 82, § 24.33 to .34.
91. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 82 § 24.33, at 97.
92. 6 AMERICNA LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 82 § 24.34, at 98.
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For example, if A gives B a general testamentary power of appointment, and B
exercises the power by setting up a trust for his or her children for life and gives
the children a special testamentary power to appoint the remainder, the special
power given to B's children violates the Rule.93 Because the general testamen-
tary power must be measured from the time it was created, B's appointment has
to be read back into A's will. The special power has thus been given to persons
unborn at A's death. It is as if A created the special power, which is capable of
being exercised beyond the period of the Rule.94 Unknowing or inadvertent ex-
ercise only increases the danger of violating the Rule.
These potential problems may be complicated even further if the existence
of the power is not discovered until some time after the donee's death. Upon
such discovery, proper disposition of the appointive assets will likely be a diffi-
cult, if not impossible, administrative problem because of the passage of time.
The Fleming court correctly gave credence to the potential dangers of inadver-
tent exercise.
Section 31-43 puts North Carolina in the minority with the rule that a gen-
eral residuary clause will exercise a power of appointment unless a contrary in-
tent is shown. 95 Many states have adopted section 2-610 of the Uniform Probate
Code96 or a similar provision, and by statute follow the common-law rule that a
general residuary clause does not exercise a power of appointment.97 States with
93. See Link, supra note 89, at 787-93. The example is based on American Trust Co. v. Wil-
liamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948). According to Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
301 N.C. 456, 272 S.E.2d 90 (1980), American Trust was overruled by McQueen v. Branch Banking
& Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952). Wing, 301 N.C. at 466 n.2, 272 S.E.2d at 97 n.2.
The exercise of the power, as illustrated by the example, would still be found to violate the Rule
notwithstanding the reasoning of the court in American Trust, which was subseqently overruled.
Link, supra note 89, at 789.
94. See Link, supra note 89, at 789.
95. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-303 (1981); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 394.060 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.71 (West Supp. 1987) (transfers by deed only); N.Y. EsT.
PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.1(a)(4) (McKinney 1967) (applies to general and nongeneral testa-
mentary powers unless subject to a specific reference requirement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,§ 299.10 (West Supp. 1980) (applies to general and nongeneral powers and to deeds and wills); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(13) (Purdon 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-6-17 (1984); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 43-11-60 (1983).
96. This section provides:
A general residuary clause in a will, or a will making general disposition of all of the
testator's property, does not exercise a power of appointment held by the testator unless
specific reference is made to the power or there is some other indication of intention to
include the property subject to the power.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-610 (1983).
97. ALA. CODE § 43-8-229 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.265 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2610 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1386.2 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-610, 15-2-303
(1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.607 (West 1983); HAW. REv. STAT. § 560:2-610 (1976); IDAHO
CODE § 15-2-610 (1979); IND. CODE § 29-1-6-1(f) (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-610
(1981); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 1A(4) (Law. Co-op. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-610
(West 1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.235 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-518 (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-2348 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:2A-29 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-610
(1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-10 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.521 (Anderson
Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.410 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-608 (Law. Co-op. 1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-610 (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-67.1 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.95.060(2) (Supp. 1987); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-110 (1980).
In Maryland a residuary clause will exercise a power of appointment only if the instrument
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no statutory provisions follow the common-law rule.98
A number of states once had statutes similar to section 31-43 but amended
them to follow the common-law rule.99 Various reasons have been given for
why these states made such amendments. First, modem powers are almost al-
ways created as an incident to a trust, and donees probably do not think of the
property as "theirs," so there is less need to try to prevent inadvertent failure to
exercise.1i° Second, the donor usually creates the general power as part of a
marital deduction trust and would prefer to have the property pass in default
rather than under a will that does not affirmatively manifest an intent to exercise
the power.101 Third, there is a great need for uniformity among the states on
this issue and this is the majority rule.10 2 Last, the common-law rule was often-
times seen as defeating the donees' intentions.10 3 Nonetheless, provisions like
section 31-43 of the North Carolina General Statutes have worked to exercise
powers even when the donee did not want the power exercised.10 4
The Moss decision put North Carolina in another minority with its holding
that a blanket exercise of "all powers which I may have" can be an effective
exercise of a power with a specific reference clause.105 Only Missouri has ruled
in a similar manner.10 6 In contrast, courts in other states have held that when a
specific reference clause is involved, something more than a blanket exercise is
needed.107 The holding in Fleming does not take North Carolina out of this
minority. The Fleming court held that "in order to exercise a power of appoint-
ment calling for specific reference to the power ... some reference to the power
must be made."10 8 This language is not inconsistent with the Moss holding,
because a blanket clause referring to "all powers I have" could still qualify as
"some" reference.
In many states with statutes similar to section 31-43, additional statutory
creating the power fails to provide for an express gift in default and if the intent to exercise the power
is expressly indicated in the will. MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-407 (1974).
98. French, supra note 52, at 754.
99. See Effland, Powers of Appointment-The New Wisconsin Law, 1967 WIS. L. REv. 583, 584.
100. Id. at 597.
101. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-610 comment (1983).
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 7.
105. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Moss, 32 N.C. App. 499, 233 S.E.2d 88, disc. rev. denied, 292
N.C. 728, 235 S.E.2d 783 (1977). For a discussion of the decision, see supra notes 56-60 and accom-
panying text.
106. Cross v. Cross, 559 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). Massachusetts had a similar decision,
Shine v. Monohan, 354 Mass. 680, 241 N.E.2d 854 (1968), the effect of which has been changed by
statute, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § IA(4) (Law. Co-op. 1981).
107. See Estate of Eddy v. Wong, 134 Cal. App. 3d 292, 184 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1982); In re Estate
of Smith, 41 Colo. App. 366, 585 P.2d 319 (1978); Talcott v. Talcott, 423 So. 2d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 1983); Leidy Chems. Found., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
276 Md. 689, 351 A.2d 129 (1976); Schwartz v. Baybank Merrimack Valley, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 169,
456 N.E.2d 1141 (1983), rev. denied, 391 Mass. 1102, 459 N.E.2d 825 (1984); Estate of Schede, 426
Pa. 93, 231 A.2d 135 (1967); First Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 607 S.W.2d 469 (renn. 1980); Holzbach v.
United Virginia Bank, 216 Va. 482, 219 S.E.2d 868 (1975).
108. Fleming, 77 N.C. App. at 571, 335 S.E.2d at 517 (emphasis added).
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provisions expressly authorize specific reference requirements.10 9 In New York,
for example, the law reads: "If the donor has expressly directed that no instru-
ment shall be effective to exercise the power unless it contains a specific refer-
ence to the power, an instrument not containing such reference does not validly
exercise the power." 110 Such statutes recognize that a donor may be concerned
about inadvertent exercise, and specific reference clauses are a device employed
to prevent it. The lack of such statutory authorization is a notable deficiency in
the North Carolina General Statutes.
The Fleming court correctly found that section 31-4 does not nullify a spe-
cific reference clause, particularly in light of the statutory language. A specific
reference clause should not be regarded as an "added formality."1 11 Although
there is logic in prohibiting the imposition of unnecessary formalities-for exam-
ple, requiring more attesting witnesses to a will than are required by law-there
is no reason to allow the intentions of the donor to be defeated through inadver-
tent exercise, especially when the donor names takers in default. To ensure that
an inadvertent exercise does not disrupt an otherwise carefully drafted estate
plan, the donor is entitled to the assurance that any alteration through exercise
will be intentional. A specific reference requirement can provide such assurance.
Although section 31-4 has been ignored for over a century, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals has interpreted it wisely in the Fleming decision. This
decision helps assure donors that powers of appointment will be exercised, if not
wisely, at least knowingly. Given the problems associated with inadvertent exer-
cise, such assurance is equally valuable to donees. It is valuable to know that a
general residuary clause that does not mention any powers does not fulfill a
specific reference requirement.
MARTHA A. CROMARTIE
109. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1385.2 (West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.114 (1979); N.Y.
Esr. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.1(b) (McKinney 1967); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-6(a) (1982);
Wis. STAT. § 702.03(1) (1975).
110. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.1(b) (McKinney 1967).
111. The practice commentary accompanying the New York statute dealing with "formalities"
notes that the statute amounts to a "direction to the donor of a power to refrain from requiring
unnecessary ceremonies in its exercise." N.Y. ESr. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.2(a)(2) practice
commentary, at 283 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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